By Alex Ababio | Special Investigative Report | August 22, 2026
The Supreme Court has rejected an attempt by Ofoase-Ayirebi Member of Parliament and lawyer Kojo Oppong Nkrumah to temporarily stop selected criminal trials from proceeding during Ghana’s ongoing legal vacation, clearing the way for a number of high-profile corruption and financial-crime prosecutions to resume.
But Friday’s decision did not finally determine the more consequential constitutional question at the centre of the dispute: how far can the Chief Justice go in using administrative powers to keep selected criminal cases moving during a period traditionally reserved for reduced judicial activity?
Justice Gabriel Scott Pwamang, sitting as a single Justice of the Supreme Court, dismissed Oppong Nkrumah’s interlocutory injunction application on August 21, 2026, holding that the applicant had not established a sufficiently strong constitutional case to justify the extraordinary interim relief. The substantive constitutional challenge remains pending.
The ruling has immediate consequences for Ghana’s high-value criminal litigation landscape, particularly cases arising from the government’s Operation Recover All Loot (ORAL) campaign.
Among the affected matters are the prosecution of former National Signals Bureau Director-General Kwabena Adu-Boahene and his wife, Angela Adjei-Boateng, and the case involving former National Food Buffer Stock Company chief executive Hanan Abdul-Wahab Aludiba and Faiza Seidu Wuni. The Adu-Boahene prosecution concerns allegations surrounding GH¢49.1 million and a cybersecurity software procurement; the accused persons have pleaded not guilty.
The constitutional battle behind the injunction
Oppong Nkrumah filed his substantive action at the Supreme Court on August 14, challenging administrative warrants issued by Chief Justice Paul Baffoe-Bonnie authorising selected High Court judges to sit during the August 1–September 30 legal vacation.
His argument is not simply that courts should close during the vacation. Rather, he contends that selecting certain criminal cases for expedited hearing while other pending criminal matters remain outside the arrangement amounts to unequal treatment and potentially violates Article 17 of the 1992 Constitution.
His writ asks the Supreme Court to declare that:
«“The action of the Honourable Chief Justice to promote and facilitate the hearing of ‘special criminal cases’ in the legal vacation to the total neglect of other criminal cases is tantamount to selective justice which contravenes the letter and spirit of Article 17(1) of the Constitution 1992 and therefore unconstitutional, null and void.”»
The MP has also stressed that he does not seek to strip the Chief Justice of his constitutional responsibility to administer the Judiciary.
“The Plaintiff readily acknowledges that the office of the Chief Justice occupies a unique constitutional position as the head of the Judiciary and is entrusted with broad administrative responsibilities for the effective and efficient functioning of the courts,” his statement of case said.
The constitutional question is therefore becoming a potentially important test of the boundary between judicial administration, discretionary power and equality before the law.
What Justice Pwamang actually decided
The Supreme Court’s injunction ruling is narrower than the political reaction surrounding it may suggest.
Justice Pwamang did not finally declare the Chief Justice’s warrants constitutional. Instead, he determined that Oppong Nkrumah had not met the threshold necessary for an interlocutory injunction.
The court held that while it possesses jurisdiction to restrain the actions of a public official, an applicant must first demonstrate a sufficiently strong substantive case before the court moves to the other considerations governing interim relief. Reports of the ruling indicate that the court found no sufficiently serious constitutional basis for stopping the vacation sittings at this stage.
The judge also rejected the argument that the arrangement necessarily violated Article 17’s equality guarantee.
Justice Pwamang reasoned that there was no evidence that the Chief Justice had directed the law to be applied differently to people because of characteristics such as colour, gender or religion. He also noted that Oppong Nkrumah had accepted that the Chief Justice possessed discretion to issue the warrants.
That distinction is crucial.
The court was effectively asking whether different procedural treatment of categories of criminal cases automatically amounts to unconstitutional discrimination. Its answer, at the injunction stage, was no.
The warrants, according to the ruling, authorised judges to deal with cases pending before their respective courts. The court therefore found it difficult to characterise the arrangement as discriminatory without evidence that the discretion had been exercised for a constitutionally prohibited reason.
Speedy trials versus equal treatment
Justice Pwamang’s reasoning also brought another constitutional value into the dispute: the right to a speedy criminal trial.
The original report of the ruling quoted the judge as saying:
«“The fact that some criminal cases are not being heard during the legal vacation does not mean that the administration of justice would not be advanced to some extent.”»
He added:
«“The fact that accused persons facing criminal prosecution do not usually take place during legal vacation ought not to be the ground for injuncting the Chief Justice’s effort at enduring a speedy hearing of cases such as galamsey, narcotics.”»
The court linked this reasoning to Articles 14(4) and 19(1), provisions that protect personal liberty and fair trial rights, including protection against unreasonable delay.
The irony at the centre of the dispute is therefore significant: both sides invoke constitutional rights.
Oppong Nkrumah’s challenge focuses on equality, administrative fairness and non-discrimination. The Chief Justice’s position, defended by the Attorney-General’s office, is being presented as an attempt to improve the speed with which criminal cases are determined.
The Ghanaian Constitution itself gives the High Court jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters, while Article 139 recognises the Chief Justice’s administrative role within the High Court structure.
GBA versus the Attorney-General: an unusually sharp legal dispute
The Supreme Court case followed a wider public disagreement between the Judiciary, the Ghana Bar Association and the Attorney-General’s office.
On August 10, GBA President Efua Ghartey wrote to Chief Justice Baffoe-Bonnie after lawyers complained about being required to attend court during the vacation. The Association argued that the established practice was for Vacation Courts to deal primarily with urgent and interlocutory matters, rather than trials. It cited Order 79 Rule 4 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2004, C.I. 47, which recognises the August 1–September 30 vacation.
The GBA’s position became particularly relevant because several law firms—including Zoe, Akyea & Co, Dame & Partners and Sam Okudzeto & Associates—had raised concerns about notices requiring lawyers to continue part-heard criminal trials during the recess.
But Deputy Attorney-General and Minister for Justice Dr Justice Edem Srem-Sai strongly rejected that interpretation.
He argued that legal vacation is not a shutdown of the justice system and that the authority to decide whether proceedings continue rests with judges rather than lawyers.
“Contrary to the GBA President’s claim, vacation Judges take proceedings on the substance of the case and do conduct trials during the legal vacation,” Srem-Sai stated.
He went further, saying:
«“What the GBA President’s proposition in her letter to the honourable Chief Justice seeks to do is grave. It seeks to move the power to manage and control court proceedings and to do justice from the hands of the Judge into the hands of a lawyer.”»
The Chief Justice himself has reportedly taken the position that lawyers cannot simply refuse to appear because it is legal vacation, while emphasising that adjournments remain judicial decisions.
The defence side raises a different constitutional risk
Oppong Nkrumah’s lawyer, Frank Davies, has focused on the accused person’s right to effective legal representation.
During the Supreme Court proceedings, Davies argued that continuing trials when defence lawyers had already informed courts of their unavailability could undermine fair-trial protections. His argument was that legal representation is not merely a technical requirement: in complex financial-crime prosecutions, counsel may need extensive preparation to cross-examine witnesses, challenge documentary evidence and protect an accused person’s interests.
That argument gains importance in cases involving large volumes of financial records, procurement documents and expert evidence.
The constitutional framework recognises an accused person’s right to defend themselves personally or through a lawyer of their choice. Ghanaian superior-court jurisprudence has repeatedly treated that protection as an important component of fair trial.
Prof Kwaku Asare challenges the foundation of the lawsuit
The debate has also attracted commentary from constitutional lawyer and academic Professor Stephen Kwaku Asare, popularly known as Kwaku Azar.
Prof Asare publicly questioned whether the Chief Justice’s decision to allow selected judges to sit during the vacation necessarily amounts to the constitutional violation alleged by Oppong Nkrumah. His intervention is significant because it separates the political question of whether selective scheduling looks unfair from the harder legal question of whether it actually breaches a constitutional provision.
Legal commentator Evans Mawunyo Tsikata similarly argued that the debate should distinguish between established professional convention and binding law. He wrote that the controversy exposes “the conflation of established practice, professional convention, and administrative tradition with binding law.”
Meanwhile, legal researcher Elorm Kwami Gorni has filed a separate Supreme Court action challenging the constitutionality of Ghana’s two-month superior-court legal vacation itself, arguing that it can restrict access to justice and contribute to delays.
The existence of that separate case shows that Ghana’s legal-vacation controversy is no longer merely a dispute about whether lawyers should take a break. It is evolving into a broader constitutional examination of access to justice, judicial efficiency and administrative power.
What happens to the ORAL cases now?
For the government, Friday’s ruling removes an immediate procedural obstacle.
The Adu-Boahene and Abdul-Wahab cases had been affected by the injunction proceedings. A High Court had temporarily halted the trials pending the Supreme Court’s decision. With the injunction dismissed, the affected prosecutions can proceed under the existing vacation arrangements.
The Adu-Boahene case has already involved extensive testimony concerning the alleged GH¢49.1 million cybersecurity software transaction. In March 2026, TV3 reported that a prosecution witness acknowledged that National Security had not made findings or complaints concerning a missing GH¢49.1 million, while the accused persons maintained their innocence.
The Buffer Stock prosecution likewise concerns allegations involving more than GH¢60 million, according to ORAL updates published before the vacation.
These cases therefore have substantial public-interest implications beyond the courtroom. They concern alleged use of public resources, accountability of public officials and the government’s promise to recover assets and prosecute suspected financial wrongdoing.
But prosecution is not conviction. All accused persons remain entitled to the presumption of innocence, a fair hearing and the opportunity to challenge the State’s evidence.
Oppong Nkrumah keeps the constitutional fight alive
Speaking to journalists after the ruling, Oppong Nkrumah said his legal team had requested a certified copy of the decision and would study it before deciding what to do next.
He said:
«“For the first time, the court has admitted that some cases have been treated differently and expeditiously. Why, he doesn’t say so. But then he proceeds to say that in his opinion, it will not amount to a violation of the constitutional articles we have raised in this particular matter and that he thinks that will even be in the interest of the persons.”»
He has indicated that a review of the decision remains possible.
That means Friday’s ruling is not the end of the constitutional battle.
The immediate question—whether selected criminal trials can continue during the 2026 legal vacation—has effectively been answered in the affirmative for now.
The bigger question remains unresolved: when does the Chief Justice’s legitimate administrative discretion become constitutionally impermissible selective treatment?
That question now sits at the heart of Oppong Nkrumah’s substantive case.
And with millions of Ghana cedis at stake in several ORAL prosecutions, the answer could shape not only the fate of individual criminal trials, but the future rules governing Ghana’s judicial calendar, constitutional equality, fair-trial rights and the government’s campaign to recover allegedly misappropriated public funds.