By Alex Ababio | SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE REPORT
Ghana’s decision to bring home 1,964 citizens from South Africa after a renewed wave of anti-foreigner violence has ended with a bill of GH¢49.72 million—a figure that raises important questions about the cost of emergency diplomacy, the protection of citizens abroad and whether Ghana is adequately prepared for future crises affecting its diaspora.
Foreign Affairs Minister Samuel Okudzeto Ablakwa disclosed on September 7, 2026, that the evacuation exercise, which began on May 27 and ended on September 4, cost GH¢49,721,786.
The exercise involved chartered and commercial flights, ground transportation, accommodation, feeding, medical treatment, hospitalisation and financial support for returnees. The government directly financed GH¢33,721,786, while businessman and philanthropist Ibrahim Mahama, through Engineers and Planners, contributed GH¢16 million.
But behind the headline figure is a deeper story: four Ghanaians died in South Africa amid the renewed tensions, Ghana formally took the issue to the African Union, and research institutions have warned that anti-migrant sentiment in South Africa is becoming increasingly organised and socially entrenched.
Where the GH¢49.7 million went
The largest expenditure—GH¢38,835,512—covered chartered flights, commercial tickets, transportation on the ground, feeding, hotel accommodation in South Africa, medical care and hospitalisation.
A further GH¢10,802,000 went into reintegration and transportation allowances, while GH¢84,274 was spent repatriating the remains of two Ghanaian nationals who died in the violence. The figures add up precisely to GH¢49,721,786.
Each returnee received a GH¢5,000 reintegration grant and GH¢500 transportation allowance.
At the simplest level, the total expenditure represents approximately GH¢25,316 per evacuated person. That figure should not, however, be interpreted as the airfare alone because the package included accommodation, feeding, medical treatment, ground transportation, reintegration support and other emergency services.
A key accountability question is therefore not simply whether GH¢49.7 million was spent, but whether the Ministry will eventually publish sufficient supporting documentation—such as contracts, invoices, flight costs and payment records—to allow taxpayers and Parliament to independently assess the value obtained for the money.
Ghana’s Public Financial Management Act, 2016 (Act 921), provides mechanisms for dealing with urgent and unforeseen expenditure. Section 36 allows advances from the Contingency Fund where an urgent or unforeseen need arises for which no other provision exists, while requiring a supplementary estimate to be presented to Parliament to replace the amount advanced.
That legal framework makes financial transparency particularly important because Ablakwa said the evacuation “could not have been anticipated and so could not be budgeted for.”
The crisis did not begin in September
The evacuation was not a sudden four-day operation.
In May, President John Dramani Mahama approved the immediate evacuation of 300 Ghanaians following renewed xenophobic attacks. More than 800 Ghanaians subsequently registered with Ghana’s High Commission in Pretoria for evacuation, forcing the government to postpone the initial operation to complete passenger screening, flight permits and other legal requirements.
The first phase eventually brought 926 Ghanaians home on chartered flights on May 27, June 6 and June 7.
A second phase began on July 26 and relied largely on commercial flights. By the conclusion of the programme on September 4, the total had reached 1,964.
The Ministry has described the evacuation as voluntary and said the first flight prioritised children, women, elderly people and sick persons.
The final group of 41 arrived in Ghana on September 4.
The Foreign Affairs Ministry subsequently said nearly 1,900 citizens had been brought home and disclosed that the remains of two Ghanaians killed in South Africa had also been repatriated. It also reported that one returnee died after arriving in Accra.
Four Ghanaian deaths put a human face on the bill
The financial cost becomes more difficult to understand without considering the human cost.
According to Ablakwa, four Ghanaians died in South Africa between April and July 2026 amid the renewed violence.
One victim, Amoonu Jailor Nash, was murdered in East London on April 3. The South African Police Service was investigating the case, according to the minister, while Nash’s remains were repatriated to Ghana on September 3.
Another victim, 44-year-old Bashiru Issahaq, a father of three, was killed on June 30 in Khayelitsha, Cape Town, during violence involving anti-immigrant demonstrators. Ghanaian authorities protested to South Africa and pressed for investigations.
Ablakwa said public calls by anti-immigration groups for foreign nationals to leave South Africa by June 30 had “devastating consequences.”
“Besides some of our nationals losing property and assets, four (4) Ghanaians lost their lives,” he said.
The Ghanaian government subsequently petitioned the African Union Commission to place xenophobic attacks against African nationals in South Africa on the continental agenda. According to Ablakwa, ECOWAS unanimously endorsed Ghana’s effort, while the AU indicated that the issue would be considered at an expected January 2027 summit.
What is driving the hostility?
The evidence suggests that the problem cannot simply be reduced to isolated street violence.
A May 2026 analysis by South Africa’s Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) found that public attitudes toward immigrants had become more hostile, with data showing a marked increase in anti-immigrant sentiment since the late 2010s, particularly after the COVID-19 period.
Human Rights Watch has similarly linked the latest wave of anti-immigrant activism to worsening socioeconomic conditions. It noted that South Africa’s unemployment rate was above 43 percent and said groups such as Operation Dudula and the newer March and March movement have scapegoated foreign nationals for economic problems, crime and poor service delivery—claims that research has challenged.
The International Commission of Jurists has also called for urgent action, warning that vigilante groups have targeted even foreign nationals whose presence complies with South African law. It urged South African authorities to dismantle vigilante networks and protect non-citizens.
Migration scholar Professor Loren Landau, a leading authority on migration in Southern Africa, told CapeTalk in July that anti-immigration protests could have consequences extending beyond immediate vandalism and disorder.
Landau warned of what he described as a “xenophobic tax”—economic costs arising from violence, disruption and damage to South Africa’s reputation as an investment destination.
The implications therefore extend beyond Ghanaian migrants. If instability discourages investment, damages businesses and weakens regional economic relationships, xenophobia becomes an economic issue as well as a human-rights crisis.
South Africa’s reputation—and Ghana’s diplomatic dilemma
South African authorities face their own difficult balancing act: addressing legitimate concerns about undocumented migration without allowing immigration policy to become a justification for collective punishment.
Justice Minister Mmamoloko Kubayi warned in June that xenophobic attacks were damaging South Africa’s international image and urged citizens to reject vigilantism and allow government institutions to enforce immigration law.
President Cyril Ramaphosa had also condemned xenophobia.
“We did not walk alone into freedom. We were carried by a tide of solidarity from the nations of Africa,” Ramaphosa said in an April 27 address, adding: “South Africa should never trample into the dust the African fellowship that made our freedom possible.”
That history matters to Ghana. Ghana was among the African states that supported the anti-apartheid struggle, making today’s attacks against Ghanaian nationals particularly sensitive diplomatically.
The Ibrahim Mahama factor
The intervention of Ibrahim Mahama’s Engineers and Planners is another important element of the story.
The company contributed GH¢16 million, covering almost one-third of the total evacuation cost. The minister publicly commended Mahama, saying:
“The government of Ghana would like to take this opportunity to commend Mr Ibrahim Mahama for his extraordinary commitment to the welfare of Ghanaians.”
The private contribution reduced the immediate burden on public finances, but it also raises a broader policy question: should emergency protection of citizens abroad depend partly on philanthropy, or should Ghana establish a predictable financing mechanism?
The government appears to be moving in that direction.
Following the evacuation, Ablakwa announced plans for a Ghanaian Diaspora Consular Fund designed to provide dedicated financial support for citizens who encounter emergencies outside the country.
The lesson for Ghana
The South Africa evacuation has exposed a vulnerability in Ghana’s foreign-policy infrastructure: protecting citizens abroad can rapidly become a multimillion-cedi operation when a crisis escalates.
The government says the evacuation was necessary because the safety and dignity of Ghanaian citizens came first.
That principle is difficult to dispute.
But the next test is accountability.
The public deserves a complete financial trail showing how GH¢49.7 million was spent, how contracts were awarded, how much individual flights and accommodation cost, how medical expenses were handled and how the GH¢16 million private contribution was accounted for.
At the same time, Ghana needs stronger early-warning systems for its diaspora, better registration of citizens overseas and diplomatic mechanisms capable of intervening before violence reaches the point where mass evacuation becomes necessary.
The government has already acknowledged the lesson. Ablakwa said authorities had identified gaps in monitoring Ghanaians travelling abroad and were developing measures to prevent circumstances requiring another mass evacuation.
The GH¢49.7 million, therefore, is more than an expenditure figure.
It is the price of an emergency response to a crisis that killed Ghanaian citizens, displaced others and exposed the continuing dangers of xenophobia in one of Africa’s largest economies.
The ultimate measure of whether the money was well spent will not only be how many Ghanaians were brought home.
It will also be whether Ghana learns enough from the crisis to ensure that the next emergency is detected earlier, financed transparently and—where possible—prevented altogether.