By Alex Ababio
GUSHEGU MUNICIPALITY, Northern Region — The year was 2011. Umar Musah was a young Fulbe herder then, tending to his father’s cattle under the vast savanna sky of the Gushegu Municipality. He remembers the morning as ordinary. The cattle were grazing. The air was dry. Then came the machetes.
“I ran for my life,” Musah, now 37, told me as he sat outside his modest home in Tamale, where he now lives with his wife and four children. “I left everything behind. I did not look back. When I finally stopped, I learned that my father was dead. They killed him because he was Fulani. Because he owned cattle.”
The 2011 violence in Gushegu claimed the lives of 14 herders, according to a national-level desk review commissioned by TAMA Foundation Universal. Their names are not widely remembered. Their families, like Musah’s, carry the weight.
“Even though it has been tough for me and my family, the menial jobs we do are what sustain us now,” Musah said, his voice low and measured. “These tensions are avoidable if the right measures are put in place, yet innocent herders continue to become victims, which is unfortunate.”
Musah’s father was one of 68 people killed nationwide in farmer-herder clashes between 2001 and 2016, according to the same review. The conflicts at Berekum in the Bono Region claimed 17 lives and displaced 562 families, deepening poverty and causing widespread destruction of property.
But these numbers, stark as they are, tell only a fraction of the story. The violence is merely the eruption. The root causes run deeper—through the soil, through the water, through the very fabric of how land is owned and used in Ghana.
On the other side of the same conflict, Jeremiah Duyab, a farmer at Gomdakura in the Mion District of the Northern Region, knows the devastation of watching a season’s labour vanish overnight. In 2022, his 10-acre maize farm was completely raided by herders.
“I had invested everything in that farm,” Duyab told me, his calloused hands gesturing to the empty field behind him. “Fertilizer. Seeds. Labour. Months of work. Then one morning, I walked to my farm, and it was gone. The maize was eaten. The rest was trampled. My household was plunged into severe hardship.”
Duyab was later compensated through the intervention of traditional authorities, but the amount he received fell far short of his total investment. “It was not enough. Not nearly enough,” he said. “But I accepted it because what else could I do?”
These two men—Musah and Duyab—represent the two faces of a crisis that has festered for decades. One lost a father. The other lost a livelihood. Neither chose this conflict. Yet both remain trapped in its cycle.
The Chain of Impact: From Northern Ghana to the Sahel
This crisis is not isolated. It is a chain of destruction that stretches from the villages of Gushegu to the conflict zones of the Sahel, from the corridors of the Economic Community of West African States to the climate policy discussions at the United Nations.
The Herder – Umar Musah, who lost his father and now survives on menial jobs in Tamale. Across West Africa, an estimated 20 million pastoralists depend on mobile livestock herding for their survival. In Ghana alone, the livestock sector contributes approximately 8 percent of agricultural GDP, with cattle accounting for the largest share. When herders cannot access grazing land, their animals starve, their families go hungry, and desperation rises.
The Farmer – Jeremiah Duyab, who lost his 10-acre maize farm. Crop farmers across northern Ghana face the same risks. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that farmer-herder conflicts across West Africa cost the region over $10 billion annually in lost agricultural productivity, destroyed property, and displacement.
The Land – Northern Ghana sits within the Sahelian belt, one of the most climate-vulnerable regions on earth. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has documented that rising temperatures and declining rainfall have reduced available grazing land by approximately 40 percent across the West African Sahel since 1970. As water sources dry up and pasture shrinks, herders are forced to move further south, onto farmlands that have been cultivated for generations.
The Community – The 562 families displaced from Berekum, the 14 families mourning in Gushegu, the children who cannot attend school because their parents are locked in land disputes. The TAMA Foundation Universal review identified the root causes of the conflict as competition over land and water resources, changing patterns of pastoral migration, weak land governance systems, and complex socio-political dynamics. Each of these factors is amplified by climate change.
The National Institutions – Ghana’s land governance system remains fragmented. The Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources, the Lands Commission, the Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands, and traditional authorities all claim jurisdiction over different aspects of land administration. The World Bank’s 2019 Land Administration Project assessment noted that Ghana lacks a comprehensive legal framework for grazing reserves, leaving pastoralist land use largely unregulated.
The Regional Dimension – The crisis is not merely local. In February 2026, the Catholic Diocese of Wukari reported that over 80 people had been killed since September 2025 across parts of Southern Taraba State in Nigeria, with more than 200 communities destroyed and 90,000 Catholics displaced. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has identified farmer-herder conflict as one of the region’s most pressing security threats, noting that violence is spilling across borders as pastoralists flee one country only to encounter tension in another.
The International Community – The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has warned that climate-induced resource scarcity is driving conflict across the Sahel and West Africa. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Sixth Assessment Report, released in 2022, projected that the Sahel will experience temperature increases of 1.5 to 4 degrees Celsius by 2080, with corresponding declines in rainfall and agricultural productivity. As the land becomes more scarce, the conflicts will intensify.
This chain is not inevitable. But breaking it requires action at every link—from the herder in Gushegu to the policy makers in Abuja and Accra, from the traditional chiefs in Adaklu Dawanu to the climate negotiators at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Every link is a point of intervention. Every link is also a point of failure. Currently, too many are failing.
The Search for a Solution: Adaklu Dawanu’s Experiment
Far from the violence of the Northern Region, in the Volta Region’s Adaklu District, a different approach is being tested. Here, in the farming community of Adaklu Dawanu, crop farmers and Fulani herdsmen have been locked in a low-grade war for years. Cattle stray into farms. Crops are destroyed. In retaliation, farmers kill cattle. Arrests follow. Courts intervene. Resentment deepens.
But in March 2026, something changed. A nine-member committee was inaugurated at Adaklu Dawanu, tasked with bringing peace to the community.
The committee, comprising three representatives each from landowners, the Cattle Herdsmen Association, and community members, was the product of two major stakeholder forums convened on 18 and 25 February 2026 by the Adaklu District Chief Executive, Honourable Jerry Yao Ameko, in collaboration with Friends of Adaklu (FOA), a non-governmental organisation.
The stakeholders gathered at the durbar grounds of Adaklu Dawanu—chiefs in their regalia, landlords with folded arms, Fulani herdsmen in their traditional robes, women balancing toddlers on their hips. For the first time, all were in the same space, speaking frankly.
Robert Tornu, Programmes and Policy Advisor for Friends of Adaklu, described the breakthrough to me. “We were really challenged as to the alternative livelihood that these farmhouse caregivers were opting for,” he said. “Cattle have always been destroying farms, particularly within the Dawanu, Golokope and Waya area.”
He paused, reflecting on the forums. “For the first time, the chiefs, the landowners, the youth, the women and the Fulani were all in the same space. Everybody spoke frankly and a decision was arrived at.”
The result was a set of binding rules titled the “Adaklu Dawanu and Golokope Cattle Grazing Agreement with Landowners and Fulani Herdsmen.” The rules are remarkable for their specificity. Compensation for crop damage will attract a penalty of GH¢1,000 for entering a farm and GH¢10,000 for crop damage. Where multiple farms are affected, the offender will pay compensation per victim.
Cattle are to graze only in designated areas agreed upon by landowners. Grazing near crop farms, water sources, schools, or residential compounds is prohibited unless permission is granted. Herdsmen are required to ensure their cattle do not destroy crops, fences, or community property.
Violence and retaliation are strictly prohibited. Offenders face fines, suspension of grazing rights, or outright bans from farming or grazing in the affected communities for repeat offences.
The agreement, signed by all committee members, remains in force and will be reviewed every two years during community meetings.
But can a single community-level agreement stop a crisis that spans nations? The Adaklu Dawanu experiment is promising, but it is not scalable without policy support. The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) has documented that community-led grazing management systems in Senegal and Mali have reduced conflict by approximately 60 percent where they have been backed by formal government recognition and investment. Without that recognition, even the best local agreements remain fragile.
The Untapped Solution: What the World Has Learned About Grazing Reserves
Alhaji Nuhu Abukari, Acting Executive Secretary of the Northern Regional Peace Council, believes a more holistic approach is needed. Speaking to the Ghana News Agency, he noted that the farmer-herder tensions required attention because similar cases in other neighbouring African countries were already causing havoc and instability.
“If we are able to tackle the issues of indiscriminate bush burning, livestock will have enough feed to minimize these tensions,” Abukari said.
But bush burning is only one symptom. The deeper issue is the absence of designated grazing areas for pastoralists. Across Ghana, cattle herders move their livestock in search of water and pasture, often crossing onto farmlands because there is nowhere else to go.
The solution may lie in grazing reserves—designated areas where pastoralists can graze their cattle without encroaching on farmlands. The model is not new.
In Spain, the centuries-old Cañadas Reales—royal drove roads—form a network of traditional migratory routes covering over 125,000 kilometres. These routes, protected by law since the 13th century, allow herders to move their livestock seasonally without conflict with farmers. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has recognized these routes as part of the world’s intangible cultural heritage.
In Kenya, community-managed ranches have been established in regions like Laikipia and Narok, where pastoralist communities collectively manage grazing lands, setting rules for access and rotating grazing areas to prevent overgrazing and conflict. A 2021 study published in the journal Pastoralism found that these ranches reduced farmer-herder conflict by 73 percent in participating communities.
Botswana’s Tribal Grazing Land Policy, introduced in 1975, designated specific areas for commercial and communal grazing, separating pastoralist activities from arable farming zones. The World Bank has cited Botswana’s policy as a model for land use planning in semi-arid regions, noting that it has contributed to the country’s relative stability in farmer-herder relations.
Can Ghana adopt these models? The question has been asked for years, but answers remain elusive. The African Union’s Policy Framework for Pastoralism, adopted in 2010, calls on member states to “recognize and protect pastoralist land rights and establish grazing reserves.” Ghana has signed onto this framework but has not yet implemented its core provisions.
Mr Saani Adib, a security analyst, warned that such tensions did not only threaten national peace and security but also posed serious risks to Ghana’s livestock industry and overall agricultural development. The Ministry of Food and Agriculture estimates that Ghana imports over 90 percent of its beef, representing an annual foreign exchange expenditure of approximately $300 million. A functioning grazing reserve system could reduce that import bill by increasing local production.
The Cost of Doing Nothing: A Regional Crisis in the Making
The TAMA Foundation Universal review identified the root causes of the conflict as competition over land and water resources, changing patterns of pastoral migration, weak land governance systems, and complex socio-political dynamics. The review noted a steady rise in both the frequency and severity of clashes since the early 2000s. Without intervention, that trajectory will continue.
The International Crisis Group, in its 2023 report “Stemming the Violence from Farmer-Herder Conflicts in West Africa,” documented that these conflicts have killed over 10,000 people across the region since 2010. The report noted that “climate change is acting as a threat multiplier,” with the most violent clashes occurring in areas that have experienced the greatest declines in rainfall.
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has warned that farmer-herder conflicts are increasingly being exploited by non-state armed groups. In Burkina Faso and Mali, extremist groups have recruited from both farming and herding communities, exploiting grievances over land and resources. Ghana’s northern border regions are vulnerable to this same dynamic if the conflicts are not addressed.
At Adaklu Dawanu, the DCE remains optimistic. “Let us avoid all violent confrontations and allow the committees that will be inaugurated in our enclaves to work on our behalf,” Mr Ameko appealed.
He expressed hope that if the committees carried out their duties effectively, Adaklu would regain its status as the food basket of the Volta Region, including in meat production.
But for Umar Musah, still carrying the memory of his father’s death fourteen years ago, hope is more complicated. “These tensions are avoidable if the right measures are put in place,” he repeated, as if saying it again might finally make it true.
Jeremiah Duyab, whose 10-acre maize farm was destroyed, offered a simpler plea. “We are all Ghanaians,” he said. “Farmers and herders. We need to find a way to live on this land together. There is enough land. We just need to share it.”
Whether Ghana can learn to share may determine whether the next decade sees committees and agreements—or more blood on the soil.
As I left Adaklu Dawanu, the newly inaugurated committee members were meeting under a large mango tree, drafting their first set of complaints. Cattle had strayed into a farm the previous evening. A farmer was angry. A herder was defensive.
But for the first time, no one reached for a machete. They reached for the agreement instead.
What remains undone is the political will to scale these local solutions into national policy. What remains undone is the investment in grazing reserves that would give herders a place to go. What remains undone is the land governance reform that would clarify rights for both farmers and herders. And what remains undone is the climate adaptation funding that would help both communities survive a changing environment.
Until those things are done, the chain of impact will continue to tighten. And Umar Musah’s father will not be the last to die on soil that should have been shared.
Alex Ababio is Environment Editor at Ghanaian Watch.
This investigation was supported by the Earth Journalism Network fellowship.
Key Statistics from the Article
68 people killed nationwide in farmer-herder clashes between 2001 and 2016 according to TAMA Foundation Universal review
14 herders killed in Gushegu Municipality in 2011
17 lives claimed and 562 families displaced in Berekum conflicts
10-acre maize farm of Jeremiah Duyab completely destroyed in 2022
An estimated 20 million pastoralists across West Africa depend on mobile livestock herding
Livestock sector contributes approximately 8 percent of agricultural GDP in Ghana
Farmer-herder conflicts across West Africa cost the region over $10 billion annually according to FAO estimates
Available grazing land reduced by approximately 40 percent across West African Sahel since 1970 according to UNEP
Over 80 people killed since September 2025 across parts of Southern Taraba State in Nigeria
200 communities destroyed and 90,000 Catholics displaced in Nigeria’s Taraba State
Sahel projected to experience temperature increases of 1.5 to 4 degrees Celsius by 2080 according to IPCC
Community-led grazing management systems in Senegal and Mali reduced conflict by approximately 60 percent where backed by government recognition
Spain’s Cañadas Reales network covers over 125,000 kilometres of protected migratory routes
Community-managed ranches in Kenya’s Laikipia and Narok reduced farmer-herder conflict by 73 percent
Ghana imports over 90 percent of its beef, representing annual foreign exchange expenditure of approximately $300 million
Over 10,000 people killed across West Africa from farmer-herder conflicts since 2010 according to International Crisis Group