By Alex Ababio | Special Report
Ghana’s fragile post-crisis financial recovery has been thrust back into the spotlight following explosive claims by former Deputy Finance Minister and current Member of Parliament for Atiwa East, Abena Osei-Asare, who has accused the governing National Democratic Congress (NDC) of “shifting accountability standards” over mounting losses at the Bank of Ghana (BoG).
Her intervention comes on the back of the central bank’s 2025 financial statements, which show a GH¢15.63 billion loss—an increase from GH¢9.49 billion recorded in 2024—while its negative equity position deteriorated sharply from GH¢58.62 billion to GH¢93.82 billion.
But beyond the numbers lies a deeper political and economic fault line—one that raises urgent questions about fiscal credibility, institutional independence, and whether Ghana’s taxpayers may ultimately shoulder the cost of central bank interventions during the country’s worst economic crisis in decades.
A Political Reversal or Economic Reality?
In a detailed statement issued on May 3, 2026, Mrs. Osei-Asare revisited the political uproar that followed BoG’s GH¢60.8 billion loss in 2022—a period marked by Ghana’s domestic debt restructuring and IMF-backed stabilization programme.
“In 2023, when the Bank of Ghana reported a GH¢60.8 billion loss for the 2022 financial year and negative equity of about GH¢55.1 billion, NDC leaders described the central bank as mismanaged, demanded resignations, and framed the matter as a question of public accountability,” she stated.
“Today, the same party cannot dismiss a GH¢15.63 billion annual loss and GH¢93.82 billion negative equity as ‘not a topic for discussion.’”
Her comments directly reference the high-profile “Occupy BoG” protests led by opposition figures in 2023, during which demonstrators demanded the resignation of then Governor Ernest Addison and his deputies.
“Then: Resignation within 21 days. Now: The 2025 loss is defended as a cost of stability and not treated as a major accountability issue,” she said.
What’s Driving the BoG Losses?
Public financial disclosures by the Bank of Ghana and analysis by multilateral institutions such as the International Monetary Fund provide critical context to the controversy.
According to the central bank’s audited accounts and IMF programme documents, the bulk of BoG’s losses since 2022 stem from:
Domestic Debt Exchange Programme (DDEP): The central bank absorbed significant losses after participating in Ghana’s sovereign debt restructuring, which required haircuts on government securities.
Monetary Policy Tightening Costs: High interest rates used to tame inflation increased the cost of central bank operations.
Exchange Rate Losses: The depreciation of the Ghana cedi during the crisis inflated foreign liabilities.
In its Ghana Country Report, the IMF acknowledged that central bank balance sheets can deteriorate during crises, noting that “quasi-fiscal operations and crisis-related interventions often weaken central bank capital positions, necessitating recapitalisation over time.”
Similarly, BoG’s own financial statements indicate that the government has committed to a phased recapitalisation programme from 2026 to 2032—a move aimed at restoring the bank’s solvency and operational independence.
Experts Weigh In: “Losses Reflect Crisis, But Transparency Is Non-Negotiable”
Independent economists and policy analysts say both sides of the political divide may be selectively interpreting the issue.
Ghanaian economist and University of Ghana professor, Godfred Bokpin, has consistently argued in media interviews that central bank losses must be understood within the broader macroeconomic crisis context.
He notes that the BoG’s financial position “reflects the cost of stabilising the economy during a severe fiscal and debt crisis,” particularly during the DDEP.
However, he also stresses that accountability cannot be sacrificed, warning that prolonged negative equity without clear transparency frameworks could undermine investor confidence.
Similarly, policy think tank IMANI Africa has previously called for stronger parliamentary oversight and clearer reporting standards on central bank interventions, emphasizing that quasi-fiscal activities must not escape scrutiny.
Taxpayer Risk: The Hidden Cost of Recapitalisation
One of the most consequential aspects of Mrs. Osei-Asare’s statement relates to the long-term fiscal implications of BoG’s losses.
She warned:
“Today’s losses become tomorrow’s taxpayer cost, debt instrument, or fiscal trade-off.”
This concern is not unfounded.
Under standard central banking practice, when a central bank’s capital is eroded, the government—its sole shareholder—must recapitalise it. This can take the form of:
Issuing government bonds to the central bank
Direct fiscal transfers
Retained earnings over time
According to public finance experts, such recapitalisation efforts can widen Ghana’s already constrained fiscal space, especially under the ongoing IMF programme, which imposes strict limits on borrowing and deficit levels.
Parliamentary Oversight Battle Looms
Mrs. Osei-Asare is now pushing for what could become a major parliamentary inquiry into the BoG’s financial health.
She has called for urgent briefings involving:
The Governor of the Bank of Ghana
The Finance Minister
External auditors
Senior BoG officials
“Operational continuity is not a defence against financial accountability,” she stressed.
Her demands align with broader calls within Ghana’s policy space for enhanced legislative scrutiny of central bank operations—especially after the unprecedented scale of losses recorded since 2022.
Double Standards or Policy Evolution?
At the heart of the debate is a critical question: Is the NDC applying double standards, or has its position evolved in response to economic realities?
Mrs. Osei-Asare framed the issue bluntly:
“The Majority called BoG losses criminal in opposition and call them stability costs in government.”
She further argued that if BoG’s GH¢55.1 billion negative equity in 2022 justified nationwide protests, then the current GH¢93.82 billion figure should trigger equal concern.
“Does the 21-day resignation test apply only when the NDC is outside government?” she asked.
Yet, some analysts argue that governing often forces political actors to confront complexities that are less visible in opposition—particularly in managing central banks during economic crises.
The Bigger Picture: Credibility, Confidence, and Reform
Beyond the political exchanges, the BoG controversy underscores a broader issue facing Ghana: restoring institutional credibility after a period of economic turbulence.
Key concerns include:
Central Bank Independence: Ensuring BoG can operate without political pressure while remaining accountable
Transparency: Publishing detailed, timely financial disclosures
Fiscal Discipline: Avoiding future quasi-fiscal operations that strain the central bank’s balance sheet
For international investors and development partners, including the International Monetary Fund, these factors are critical to sustaining confidence in Ghana’s recovery trajectory.
Conclusion: A Test Case for Accountability
As Ghana navigates its post-crisis recovery, the debate triggered by Abena Osei-Asare may prove to be more than a partisan dispute—it could become a defining test of how the country balances economic necessity with democratic accountability.
Her call is unequivocal:
If central bank losses once demanded resignations, they should not now be dismissed as routine.
Whether Parliament acts on her demands—or the government successfully reframes the narrative as a necessary cost of economic stabilisation—will shape not only the future of the Bank of Ghana but also public trust in Ghana’s financial governance.
For now, one thing is clear: the numbers are rising, the politics are intensifying, and the ultimate cost may rest with the Ghanaian taxpayer.