By Alex Ababio | Special Investigative Report
When the Minister of Roads and Highways, Governs Kwame Agbodza, rose in Parliament on Wednesday to address concerns over Ghana’s cocoa roads programme, his admission was striking.
“The awarding of cocoa road contracts valued at GH¢23 billion during the 2023/2024 fiscal year” has contributed significantly to the financial challenges confronting the Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD), he said.
The statement confirmed what industry analysts, cocoa farmers, and financial observers have whispered for months: that a massive infrastructure spending spree under COCOBOD—an institution already burdened by debt, declining production, and volatile global prices—may have stretched the state cocoa regulator beyond its limits.
This investigation examines how the cocoa roads programme evolved, what public financial documents reveal, and whether Ghana’s ambition to fix feeder roads in cocoa-growing areas inadvertently worsened COCOBOD’s fiscal fragility.
A GH¢23 Billion Commitment
According to Mr. Agbodza, a total of 266 cocoa road contracts were awarded, amounting to GH¢23 billion in the 2023/2024 fiscal year alone. The scale of the commitment is unprecedented in the history of the cocoa roads initiative.
He explained in Parliament that “the sheer magnitude of the contracts compelled COCOBOD to channel significant funds into procuring construction materials, which adversely affected the institution’s financial standing.”
The cocoa roads programme was initially conceived as a targeted intervention to rehabilitate feeder roads in cocoa-producing communities. Poor road networks have long undermined the cocoa value chain, increasing post-harvest losses, transport costs, and farmer hardship.
Yet, by 2023, the financial strain was evident. COCOBOD’s annual reports and audited statements in recent years have shown rising indebtedness, compounded by syndicated loans, forward sales agreements, and production shortfalls. Public debt disclosures indicate that COCOBOD’s liabilities have ballooned into billions of cedis, raising questions about fiscal sustainability.
An Accra-based financial analyst who reviewed COCOBOD’s borrowing patterns described the cocoa roads commitment as “a quasi-fiscal expansion undertaken without corresponding revenue certainty.”
“Cocoa production has been declining due to climate change, disease, illegal mining (galamsey), and smuggling across borders. When revenue is shrinking, capital-intensive commitments must be scrutinized carefully,” the analyst said.
The 2017 Suspension and Its Fallout
Mr. Agbodza also reminded Parliament that the suspension of cocoa road projects in 2017 had serious consequences.
“The suspension of cocoa road projects in 2017 had adversely affected cocoa-growing communities, resulting in deteriorating road networks, halted contracts, disruptions to the cocoa value chain, and hardships for farmers,” he noted.
Indeed, between 2017 and 2020, multiple contracts were reportedly paused amid concerns about procurement irregularities and funding gaps. Contractors abandoned sites. Partially constructed roads eroded under heavy rains. Farmers in Western North, Ashanti, Bono, and Eastern regions complained of vehicles refusing to access farms during peak seasons.
In Sefwi-Wiawso, a cocoa farmer interviewed for this report recalled transporting beans on motorbikes over muddy tracks. “When roads are bad, we lose money. Buyers reduce prices or delay collection,” he said.
Development economists agree that feeder roads are critical infrastructure for agricultural economies. According to studies by the World Bank and Ghana’s Ministry of Food and Agriculture, rural road improvements can significantly boost farmgate incomes and reduce poverty.
But the question remains: Should COCOBOD be the one financing and managing road infrastructure at this scale?
Institutional Mandate or Mission Creep?
COCOBOD’s core mandate is to regulate, purchase, market, and promote cocoa production. Infrastructure development traditionally falls under the Ministry of Roads and Highways.
Acknowledging this tension, Mr. Agbodza announced in Parliament: “In view of these challenges, the government has ceded all cocoa road projects to the Ministry of Roads and Highways, particularly the Urban and Feeder Roads Departments.”
This transfer signals a major policy shift. By reassigning cocoa roads to the Roads Ministry, government appears to be correcting what critics call “institutional overlap.”
A former COCOBOD official, speaking on condition of anonymity, argued that the cocoa roads programme blurred operational lines. “We became financiers of road projects instead of focusing on cocoa productivity, disease control, and farmer support.”
He added that funding road construction through cocoa-backed borrowing increased exposure to commodity price volatility.
Value for Money and Procurement Concerns
During Wednesday’s parliamentary session, the Minister responded to questions on the government’s value-for-money analysis and the status of the cocoa roads programme.
Public procurement experts have long flagged risks in large-scale contract awards, particularly when multiple contracts are awarded simultaneously.
Awarding 266 contracts within a fiscal year—worth GH¢23 billion—raises concerns about due diligence, contractor capacity, and cost benchmarking. Industry engineers consulted for this investigation said such volume could overwhelm monitoring systems.
“If supervision is weak, projects risk cost overruns, substandard materials, and delayed completion,” one civil engineer said.
Mr. Agbodza emphasized the need for “a comprehensive review of the programme to ensure efficiency and sustainability.”
That review, according to ministry insiders, will assess project completion rates, cost per kilometre, contractor performance, and funding structures.
A Sector Under Pressure
The cocoa sector itself is under strain. Production has declined in recent seasons, affected by swollen shoot disease, aging farms, climate variability, and illegal mining activities that degrade arable land.
Ghana, the world’s second-largest cocoa producer after Côte d’Ivoire, depends heavily on cocoa for foreign exchange earnings. Any financial instability within COCOBOD has macroeconomic implications, including pressure on syndicated loans that support annual crop purchases.
International rating agencies have previously cited COCOBOD’s debt levels in assessing Ghana’s broader fiscal risk profile.
A senior agricultural economist at the University of Ghana explained: “When COCOBOD borrows heavily for non-core activities, it increases repayment risk, especially in years of poor harvest or global price volatility.”
Farmers Caught in the Middle
While policymakers debate fiscal strategy, cocoa farmers continue to bear the brunt of infrastructural neglect.
In regions like Bibiani and Goaso, farmers report that bad roads reduce access to fertilizers, extension services, and markets. Transport costs eat into margins, while delayed bean evacuation can affect quality grading.
Many farmers welcome the transfer of cocoa roads to the Roads Ministry, hoping it will streamline project management.
“If Roads Ministry handles it directly, maybe projects will be faster and better supervised,” said a cocoa cooperative leader in Ashanti Region.
Yet, skepticism remains. Ghana’s road sector has its own funding constraints, often dependent on statutory funds and external financing.
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The Way Forward
Mr. Agbodza’s parliamentary admission underscores a broader lesson in public financial management: infrastructure ambitions must align with institutional capacity and revenue stability.
The decision to cede cocoa road projects to the Ministry of Roads and Highways suggests recognition that COCOBOD’s financial health is paramount—not only for farmers but for Ghana’s economy.
Moving forward, analysts recommend:
A full audit of all 266 contracts.
Publication of cost-per-kilometre data for transparency.
Strengthened parliamentary oversight.
Clear separation between commodity regulation and infrastructure financing.
The cocoa roads programme began as a lifeline for rural communities. But as this investigation shows, its scale—GH¢23 billion in a single fiscal year—may have strained the very institution meant to safeguard Ghana’s cocoa industry.
For COCOBOD, the road to recovery may now depend not just on cocoa yields and global prices, but on disciplined fiscal governance and institutional reform.
As Mr. Agbodza told Parliament, the need now is for “a comprehensive review of the programme to ensure efficiency and sustainability.”
Whether that review restores confidence—or uncovers deeper systemic weaknesses—will shape the future of Ghana’s most important agricultural export.